00:40.4
You and I are trying to get a lot of content in.
00:42.6
Yeah, exactly, exactly.
00:44.1
And obviously, you're also the co-founder of the Marathon Initiative
00:47.6
and you formerly also served as Director of the Defense Program at the CNES,
00:52.6
Center for New American Security.
00:54.1
But importantly, we also want to talk about your book, Strategy of Denial,
00:59.1
so if I don't know, back in the day, in the 50s, some of the WASP intellectuals were talking about containment
01:06.0
and now maybe Strategy of Denial is a new word in town.
01:10.2
How are you, Elbridge? Thank you for joining us.
01:12.8
Great to be doing well.
01:14.1
Richard, thanks for asking.
01:15.2
Great to be with you and great to be on your show.
01:17.4
I know tremendous respect for your intellect and incisiveness
01:21.0
and also you've got a tremendous reach, so it's a pleasure to be and be able to speak to an audience
01:25.6
that's so significant, not only in Asia, but around the world.
01:29.6
Thank you for that, Elbridge.
01:30.6
Of course, we hope to have you back in Asia soon.
01:32.8
Last time we crisscrossed, I was back in the U.S., East Coast, West Coast, you were in Asia.
01:37.0
But hopefully, next time, we can have you in person also in the region
01:39.7
because your voice is extremely important.
01:42.8
The arguments you're making are increasingly becoming, I think,
01:46.5
the mainstream understanding of, not maybe in the U.S., but at least in this part.
01:51.3
Yeah, I think it's sort of common sense in my view, but you know,
01:55.0
common sense is controversial sometimes.
01:57.1
Welcome to the club. I mean, of course.
02:01.5
Now, Elbridge, obviously, you know, we can talk about elections and politics some other time.
02:06.6
This is not the time for that, but for people, I'm sure people who Google you will understand
02:09.9
that you could once again be in a position, an important position in the coming years or so.
02:14.4
But regardless, it's your thoughts that matter.
02:17.1
First of all, Elbridge, before we go, because really what brought this discussion to forth
02:22.6
is this latest supplemental emergency budget passed by the United States.
02:27.1
A huge part of that is going to Ukraine.
02:29.2
A significant part, of course, going also to Israel, your key allies in the Middle East.
02:32.8
And then there's a few billion dollars in the Indo-Pacific and some for the Philippines.
02:35.9
Now, before I go there, I want people to...
02:38.1
They found it in the couch.
02:39.7
They're looking around on the couch.
02:41.1
They found something for the Asia.
02:43.3
Yeah, I mean, okay, we can have a conversation.
02:45.9
I mean, you saw me.
02:47.2
I mean, many people also disagree with me because, you know, my idea is let's push the envelope.
02:51.7
I mean, the nature of threat is something else.
02:54.0
So I'm good to have kindred spirits in terms of appreciation.
02:57.1
I think the China, well, China factor, if I can put it that way, more neutral way.
03:02.3
But first, let's start with your book, Strategy of Denial.
03:06.0
I mean, to what degree was this informed by your role in shaping the national defense strategy of the former administration?
03:14.2
Tell me a little bit, sorry, about the framing of the national defense strategy.
03:17.0
I mean, to the degree that it's not confidential.
03:18.9
How does it inform your book?
03:20.4
And what is your understanding of the reception of the book so far?
03:24.3
Well, thank you very much.
03:25.4
It's a little bit...
03:26.0
It's funny in a way.
03:27.1
Because actually, you know, I played a role, obviously, others as well, and certainly Secretary Mattis under President Trump, etc.
03:34.5
You know, in a sense, we already made the strategic shift in the most significant place, which is the Department of Defense, to focus on China, to focus on warfighting.
03:43.4
For those who are interested, there is the public version of the national defense strategy.
03:47.9
It's not necessarily a very accurate or kind of useful because it's an unclassified summary.
03:56.8
It's not a direct version.
03:58.7
For those who are interested, I gave testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in the U.S. in 2019, I think in early 2019.
04:06.8
And I laid out in my testimony, it's available online if you just Google it.
04:11.2
That gives you a kind of a sort of a breakdown of the national defense strategy of 2018.
04:16.8
And I think, you know, public statements from Secretary, Acting Secretary of Defense Shanahan and Secretary of Defense Esper, pretty clear.
04:24.1
I mean, is China focused?
04:25.7
Focused on Russia?
04:26.8
Restoring the American military's warfighting edge in the face of movements primarily by China, to a lesser degree by Russia, to build up what are called A2AD bubbles, etc.
04:36.0
Kind of, you know, develop theories of victory to go after exposed U.S. allies, etc.
04:40.4
So, you know, I already had very strong ideas, which I was pushing in the Pentagon.
04:45.7
Again, you know, success has many fathers, rightly.
04:49.2
But where did the book come from?
04:51.9
The book came from my experience in the Pentagon, which is that the strategy had actually already changed.
04:57.0
But in a system like the American system in particular, although probably in any system, you need to convince and explain, especially when a document is not widely available and itself is somewhat the product of bureaucratic compromise.
05:10.8
I will say that I have no reason to complain about the national defense strategy of 2018.
05:14.5
It's pretty darn clear for a bureaucratic document.
05:18.0
And I'm proud of that for whatever role I played.
05:21.2
But I also felt like somebody needs to make the clear case so that everybody understands.
05:27.0
In the Pentagon, it's military officers who are out in the field or are not working in the Pentagon, don't have access.
05:33.2
It's allies, the allies from the Philippines and Japan and Australia and, you know, in NATO and in the Middle East.
05:40.1
It's our opponents.
05:41.5
I think that, for instance, the Chinese and the Russians should understand what we're trying to do and what we're not trying to do, at least from my point of view, which is to understand that this is a limited strategy.
05:50.7
It's not a strangulation strategy.
05:53.0
It's not an existential threat to the future of China or Russia.
05:56.8
As much as we oppose their aggressive ambitions in places like Ukraine and potentially against Taiwan.
06:02.2
But there is a way, a balance of power model that I'm expressing to journalists, to members of Congress, to regular people.
06:09.5
For instance, one of the things I was most proud of is that my book was named Audio Book of a Week by a truckers organization in the United States.
06:18.6
I was very proud of that because I worked very hard to make the book.
06:22.4
It's not easy, but it's accessible to everybody.
06:25.1
And I really hope that's true.
06:26.8
It's not trying to hide behind jargon or artificial complexity.
06:31.2
I'm a believer in being as parsimonious as you can.
06:35.1
And look, you know, I mean, people who are driving trucks are voters, right?
06:39.0
They play a critical national role in our economy.
06:43.8
And frankly, a lot of that kind of demographic are the people who have fought and will fight in the wars.
06:49.2
And those are a lot of the people who are most skeptical after 20 years of the forever wars, so to speak.
06:55.6
So that's why I wrote the book.
06:56.8
What's its reception?
06:57.5
That's for others to others to judge.
07:00.7
It seems to be getting traction.
07:02.8
It seems to still in some ways, I think the book is more relevant now than when it came out three years ago.
07:08.6
It would have been better to have addressed the problems.
07:10.5
But we're sort of we're digging our hole further.
07:12.9
In my view, we've made some progress, but we're still heading towards the iceberg.
07:16.8
And that that worries me a great deal, as you know.
07:20.3
Why did you say strategy of denial?
07:23.2
In what sense is this different from treatment or even?
07:26.8
What is different here?
07:27.8
Well, I would say it's a two level.
07:28.8
There's actually a guy was doing a radio interview in L.A., came up with a third.
07:30.8
The first denial is getting over the denial that, say, a Robert Kagan or a John Bolton exhibits, which is that we are no longer in the unipolar world.
07:32.8
So that's the kind of first thing is the entering.
07:33.8
And that's how I start the book is to say America is no longer the unipolar power.
07:34.8
That is not if we ever were.
07:35.8
That is not because I'm wearing a hair shirt or lacerating myself out of guilt and Americans are in decline.
07:36.8
No, it's a fundamental reality and very important.
07:37.8
It's a fundamental reality.
07:38.8
It's a fundamental reality.
07:39.8
It's a fundamental reality.
07:40.8
It's a fundamental reality.
07:41.8
It's a fundamental reality.
07:42.8
It's a fundamental reality.
07:43.8
And it's a fundamental reality.
07:44.8
It's a fundamental reality.
07:45.8
And that is the first.
07:46.8
That is the first thing is the entering.
07:47.8
And that's how I start the book is to say America is no longer the unipolar power.
07:48.8
That is not if we ever were.
07:49.8
That is not because I'm wearing a hair shirt or lacerating myself out of guilt and Americans are in decline.
07:54.8
No, it's a fundamental reality and very apparent to anybody in Asia.
07:58.2
Of course, that China is rising, but also India, ASEAN, the overall global power situation is just not what it was in 1995.
08:04.9
So that's the first thing.
08:06.8
But then in terms of what the strategy is, it's a twofold.
08:09.5
One is and any sane and rational, totally moral strategy.
08:13.4
One is to use a new strategy.
08:13.6
One is to use a new strategy.
08:13.6
One is to use a new strategy.
08:13.7
Military strategy should emerge from a sane and rational and moral geopolitical strategy for the country.
08:19.5
And that's what should be the proper goal of American foreign policy in a world in which we are not as dominant as we were.
08:27.7
And that is to deny any state the ability to dominate one of the key regions of the world,
08:33.1
especially the most important one, which today is Asia.
08:35.6
75 years ago was Europe, 50 years ago was Europe, today it's Asia as a product of economic reality.
08:39.8
Is that also Mersheimer, John Mersheimer also?
08:42.1
Yeah, I mean, I think it's similar to that.
08:43.6
I mean, there are many things I agree with John Mersheimer about.
08:46.8
There are some things I disagree with him about.
08:48.6
I have a lot of respect for his analysis and the courage of his convictions, even as I disagree with him on a number of issues.
08:54.7
But yeah, it's basically, I mean, I would say John is probably, he's a thoroughgoing offensive realist.
09:01.7
I wouldn't define myself as an offensive realist or a defensive realist.
09:04.9
I don't, it's kind of the view, I don't think of myself as a hawk or a dove because these things are contextual.
09:09.3
I think of myself as a realist.
09:10.7
But the goal, which if you go back to George Kennedy,
09:13.6
Kennan's speech of the National Defense University after World War II or the work of Nicholas Spikeman during the Second World War,
09:19.3
that's the classic American goal.
09:20.9
And so it's kind of going back to those sort of original sources.
09:24.3
So that's geopolitical denial.
09:25.4
And then there's also the second meaning, third meaning is military denial, which is to hold up that goal,
09:31.0
which needs what I call an anti-hegemonic coalition.
09:33.8
You have to have a military force and capability, especially in that primary region, Asia, which will defend it.
09:41.1
What does that require?
09:42.1
Military denial, which is basically...
09:43.6
To defend our allies, including the Philippines.
09:46.6
Taiwan is a special case, but against invasion by the potential hegemon, which is in this case, excuse me, which is China.
09:55.5
Thank you for that.
09:56.4
And how do you feel that the term strategy of denial is now being deployed, sometimes with direct credit to you,
10:03.5
maybe sometimes not as much, by people across the political spectrum?
10:07.0
I mean, from New Left Review to the Australian government, they're using the terminology.
10:11.1
How do you feel about that?
10:13.6
It's not about me, but I feel that the concept is really being accepted.
10:18.1
So it's interesting.
10:18.7
I mean, you mentioned the Australian government has actually mentioned it in its previous defense strategy.
10:24.2
But in the one they just released, they specifically say they're going to make a capitalized strategy of denial of the cornerstone on their defense plans.
10:31.0
Actually, the American government under the Biden administration has said a denial defense is going to be their military standard for Taiwan.
10:37.1
I believe Cath Hicks and I believe Colin Call, certainly Eli Ratner has said that.
10:42.1
The Japanese government is basically...
10:43.6
They said words to that effect using concepts like denial, very similar to what I'm arguing.
10:48.9
And the shift even in Taiwan is more uneven, but the move towards the kind of porcupine idea is encouraging as well.
10:57.0
The way I think about it now is we've made enormous progress at the strategic conceptual level of how to think about the military strategy for Asia.
11:06.8
I think we've basically got the strategy right, and it's largely agreed, and it's not a partisan issue.
11:12.0
They may not give credit to me.
11:13.6
As long as I'm a Republican or they don't like me, whatever, that's fine.
11:16.1
But as long as the ideas are getting through, that's the main...
11:18.4
And I don't own these ideas, obviously.
11:20.7
So I want to see the ideas succeed most.
11:25.6
I'm not above wanting some credit and so forth, but the main thing is to see the ideas.
11:30.5
Where I'm more concerned is in the implementation.
11:35.6
And I would direct people's attention to a very good article by Ed Wong and a number of others in the New York Times that shows the immense progress.
11:43.6
That's happened in the U.S. or between the U.S. and its allies like the Philippines, Japan, Australia on posture.
11:50.7
But the key line in that piece is a comment from Sam Paparo, the new Indo-PACOM commander.
11:56.6
He says, we've been growing our combat capability here in the Pacific over the last years.
12:00.7
True, two thumbs up.
12:01.6
But then he goes on to say, but our trajectory is still not a trajectory that matches our adversary.
12:06.3
Our adversaries are building more capability, and they're building more warships per year than we are.
12:10.9
So it's all relative.
12:12.3
That's one concern.
12:13.2
And then I think at the macro level, it's a very frustrating part of the debate, and I think you've probably seen this, Richard.
12:21.0
I don't have people directly challenging so much the applicability and appropriateness of a strategy of denial for the Pacific.
12:30.5
But people are basically thinking that we can do that while we are doing all the other things.
12:35.4
So it's not a direct challenge.
12:36.8
It's that people are thinking that we're still in the unipolar moment.
12:39.4
As President Biden says, we can do everything.
12:41.0
There are many Republicans who think that way.
12:43.1
And that's just not going to add up.
12:45.9
So the debate has moved from the realm of what's our right overall military strategy, I think.
12:52.8
Things like the anti-hegemonic coalition are forming.
12:55.7
It's now a matter of prioritization, implementation, and discipline.
13:01.4
And that's where I think things are now, unfortunately.
13:04.0
Well, for good or ill.
13:05.8
I mean, we're going to speak more about this issue of prioritization, which is everything.
13:09.5
I mean, the devil is really in the details, right?
13:11.3
You can agree with Paul, but it's there.
13:13.1
The operationalization, that is everything.
13:15.6
But can I ask you first, because I want to talk about also your experience of dealing with the Philippines.
13:19.9
And we are going through a massive transformation also here from Duterte to Marcos administration, as you obviously see.
13:27.1
But before that, can you tell me a little bit about your experience from serving in different Republican administrations?
13:32.6
I think you were in the Bush administration.
13:36.1
Yes, albeit at a very junior role, sure.
13:38.7
You're a very young guy, so I think people can guess.
13:40.7
I mean, I'm older than I look, but thank you.
13:43.1
So can you tell me about evolution of American foreign policy, including Republican foreign policy, these two decades from Iraq war all the way to the latest developments in Asia?
13:54.6
Well, let me start a little bit farther back, because I think that's an excellent question.
13:58.3
And maybe I'll focus particularly on Republican foreign policy, because actually a lot of my time I spend debating other Republicans.
14:05.2
It's not that I don't disagree with the Democrats in various ways.
14:11.3
But for various reasons, I often end up debating with other Republicans.
14:16.0
I think if you go back historically, obviously, during the Second World War and immediately after, there was a strong faction of kind of genuine isolationist Republicans.
14:26.8
I think that group, that idea really kind of fell by the wayside as of probably like the early 1950s, if not before.
14:39.5
What became the dominant?
14:41.9
I would say for the Republican administrations of Eisenhower and Nixon was what I would actually identify myself with.
14:49.9
So you have a lot of prominent commentators or members of Congress like Senator McConnell will say that there's an isolationist wing and frame this as between internationalists and isolationists.
15:00.1
I actually think that's a false dichotomy.
15:01.9
The economists did a very good job framing what I think the real Republican spectrum of opinion is in an issue a couple of weeks ago based on some work by the European Council on Foreign Policy.
15:11.4
And I think that's a false dichotomy.
15:11.9
So I think that's a false dichotomy.
15:11.9
So I think that's a false dichotomy.
15:11.9
So I think that's a false dichotomy.
15:12.0
Which is primacists, basically people who think the United States should be the global hegemon on one extreme, and restrainers or even isolationists.
15:19.7
I don't like to use the term isolationist because I think it's unfair to them on the other extreme.
15:23.8
There are some who are probably genuine isolationists.
15:26.0
Many of them are just kind of much more loath to use military force.
15:29.3
And then in the middle are what they call the prioritizers.
15:31.7
And I'm identified with that group.
15:33.3
I think if you look back at, say, like President Eisenhower and President Nixon, that's much closer to this kind of prioritizer model.
15:42.1
Yeah, and even as late as the 90s, it's worth remembering that Bob Dole ran in 1996 against President Clinton against Democrat wars.
15:50.6
So during the Cold War, most of the wars broke out under Democrats, under President Truman, fairly or not.
15:57.7
I mean, it's a kind of partisan point, really.
15:59.6
But bear in mind that under President Truman, for instance, who's now lionized, he was very unpopular by the end of his administration because the war in Korea had broken out.
16:08.4
It was seen as very unsatisfactory.
16:10.0
A lot of people were killed.
16:11.3
And the defense spending was about 12 to 13 percent, I think, of GDP.
16:15.6
So when President Eisenhower came into office, he was running on cutting the defense budget.
16:20.9
And actually, President Eisenhower's goal was to have U.S. troops largely out of Europe within about a decade or so.
16:26.5
You know, we can go back and look at the record.
16:27.8
But, you know, bear in mind, President Eisenhower is a mix.
16:30.1
There was some hawkish elements.
16:31.4
Certainly, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was quite hawkish.
16:34.4
And part of the Republican constituency was very hawkish.
16:37.6
But President Eisenhower himself, I think, usually landed on a...
16:41.3
He was very conscious of constrained resources.
16:44.8
He was very conscious of political will.
16:46.8
Of course, famously, he did not...
16:48.5
He chose not to intervene in Indochina in 1954 when the French position collapsed.
16:54.3
And then if you go to President Nixon, you know, President Nixon, this is something relevant certainly in Southeast Asia, a place like Vietnam.
17:00.9
Of course, Vietnam and Philippines, etc.
17:03.7
It was famously the Nixon Doctrine, which was also very acutely conscious of the matching the resources and political will available.
17:11.3
And very similar, in a sense, I think, to what President Trump has been calling for, which is allies assuming more responsibility, you know, kind of regional sheriff model.
17:23.1
The Republican Party changed a lot under President Reagan.
17:26.4
President Reagan was very...
17:28.2
In some sense, he ran and his background was from the much more sort of rollback wing of the Republican Party, more aggressive, more existential.
17:40.1
That's where he ran from.
17:41.3
The way he actually governed, and it's complicated because of the role of people like George Shultz, and also the political environment after Vietnam, he actually did not use the American military very much, right?
17:50.9
I mean, he intervened in Grenada and in Lebanon, and those were the two examples.
17:55.0
So President Reagan's rhetoric was very aggressive and high, but his actions, for various reasons, were quite selective, and it really was a piece of strength.
18:06.9
And then, of course, he famously, and was criticized by the hawks for this, engaged with...
18:11.0
With Mikhail Gorbachev to end the Cold War.
18:17.1
And bear in mind that they didn't know the Soviet Union was going to collapse.
18:19.6
The Cold War actually ended probably around 1986, 87, even really before the collapse of the Soviet Empire, certainly by 1989.
18:26.5
Soviet Union only collapsed in 1991.
18:28.4
Now, what happened, and I'll get to your question, is after the collapse of the Soviet Union, I would say a kind of neo-Reaganite view became dominant in the Republican Party.
18:37.4
And Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan, it's not an accident.
18:41.0
The biggest advocates wrote a famous article in Foreign Affairs that reflected that view.
18:45.0
That came into ascendancy or hegemony within the Republican Party with the George W. Bush administration, which was the purest form of maximalist, global liberal hegemony.
18:56.9
Full-spectrum dominance.
18:57.7
Full-spectrum dominance, use of military force unilaterally if necessary.
19:04.8
So when people say, oh, they're critics of this view, are trying to overthrow...
19:10.6
The whole post-World War II order and approach, that is false.
19:14.8
What Republican, I think a lot of Republicans, certainly I am opposing, is the George W. Bush neo-Reaganite, which is not even Reagan himself, in fairness.
19:24.9
And that's very important to understand.
19:28.5
Because, look, my view is the last 25 years of American foreign and economic policy have been a disaster.
19:35.7
And I say this as a Republican.
19:37.1
You have to give Bill Clinton quite a bit of credit.
19:39.2
By the end of the 1990s, the U.S. had a balanced budget.
19:43.6
China was a blip on the horizon militarily.
19:46.6
We were the world's largest economy.
19:49.0
Social cohesion was pretty darn good.
19:51.8
Crime was at historic lows, etc., etc., etc.
19:55.2
Following 25 years, 9-11, which was not in anybody's control, but a reaction.
20:00.8
Trillions of dollars, thousands of people, or tens of thousands of people wounded, killed in the Middle East wars.
20:08.1
Financial crisis.
20:09.2
Worse since the Great Depression.
20:11.4
Social discord, etc., etc.
20:13.2
And the reaction among Republicans and Democrats to the opposition to the neo-Reaganite foreign policy comes from that.
20:22.3
And so this gets to the point here is what I'm trying to do is both at the strategic level but also at the political and fiscal level
20:29.6
is to grapple with the reality of where the trajectory in not only among Republicans but I think largely among independents and Democrats,
20:36.3
which is anti-interventionist.
20:37.2
It is akin to oppressive.
20:39.2
Post-Vietnam spirit.
20:40.7
The problem is a lot of these neo-Reaganites just say we need another Reagan to emerge and then we'll just be able to solve all of our problems.
20:46.9
But the reality is that we're not where we were in 1980.
20:49.4
Our fiscal situation is far worse.
20:52.1
Our demographics are different.
20:53.1
And we're facing China, which was far more powerful than the Soviet Union actually was, certainly in economic capacity.
20:59.9
So that's sort of, I think, the right way to understand what's going on politically in terms of the foreign policy divide.
21:05.2
I mean, thanks for pointing that out because, you know, I see some continuity between.
21:09.5
Nixon's approach.
21:10.6
I mean, having a regional gendarmerie, having a detente with China to isolate the Soviet Union.
21:16.0
And then later on, Bill Clinton saying something along the lines of, you know, we're not going to be number one forever.
21:21.5
So while we're kind of in the number one position, let's negotiate a structured future whereby American and American interests could be protected.
21:29.8
My sense is your prioritization approach is kind of mirroring this interesting overlap between how Bill Clinton and Nixon, Richard Nixon, understood the future.
21:39.0
I think that's right.
21:39.8
And actually, you know, I have some overlap right now with the administration on like China policy.
21:45.1
I'm in favor of talking to the Chinese president.
21:47.3
Trump has said he'd be open to talking to Xi Jinping.
21:49.3
I think that's good.
21:49.8
As James Baker used to say, it's more important to talk to your, you know, it's most important to talk to your enemies.
21:54.9
There's the ones you need to communicate to.
21:56.7
So just talking to your friends is not doing diplomacy.
22:00.3
Not that I have, unlike of the Democrats, I have pretty low expectations of what that can achieve.
22:06.1
But I don't, I think that the key thing there is.
22:09.0
What is in the best interest of the American people?
22:11.3
So the neo-Reaganite crowd will say, oh, America is a superpower.
22:14.2
We have to act like a superpower.
22:15.2
And I was going to say, it's not written in the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence that we have to be a superpower.
22:20.1
It's good to be a superpower, I guess.
22:22.1
But the most important thing is for the American people to be secure, prosperous, and free.
22:27.5
So, you know, I think that's the thing.
22:30.4
And if we are no longer the world's number one dominant superpower, that's not necessarily.
22:35.6
I think America wants to be great.
22:37.8
But that doesn't require dominating everybody else.
22:41.8
And that's the difference between, say, my view and, say, the John Bolton view.
22:44.6
I don't, I mean, I think you can see in how I engage in the public and my writing.
22:49.1
And I make this point to the Chinese whenever I have the opportunity.
22:52.2
I'm not trying to humiliate them.
22:53.7
I'm trying not to hold them down.
22:55.7
But, and this is basic core American idea, but also balance.
22:59.7
They're very strong.
23:01.0
And you can't take their amount at their word.
23:03.2
So we have to balance them.
23:04.3
But I'm not saying that they can't be also.
23:07.8
You know, successful and rising and so forth.
23:11.2
I mean, if diplomacy is just for friends, then you don't need diplomacy.
23:16.5
That's why diplomacy.
23:19.4
Before we go, we talk about your understanding of U.S.-Philippine relations.
23:23.6
And then we go bigger with discussing the regional strategy again.
23:29.0
You know, so over the past few weeks and back and forth, I've been D.C., South Carolina, Berkeley.
23:34.4
I see some interesting convergence in terms of, you know,
23:37.8
we're talking about very different states, very different blobs, very different understanding.
23:42.2
But I see some general understanding among the, you know,
23:45.5
let's just say folks are more tuned in into world affairs in terms of the limitations of American power,
23:50.5
but also the kind of realism that you have to have.
23:53.2
But at the same time, I also notice there is some significant difference.
23:56.2
I mean, I think there are parts of America which are very confident about your position in the world.
24:00.9
And then, you know, probably even in more liberal circles, there's a lot of self-laceration,
24:05.4
a lot of despondency and all of that.
24:07.8
But you're saying your approach is somewhere in the middle.
24:10.2
Is there also enough of middle America in a strategic sense,
24:13.8
not only in an electoral political sense, where the two can come together?
24:17.8
I think so, because a lot of American foreign policy is going to depend on the presidency.
24:21.6
So my political strategy for the foreign policy I'm advocating to come into play
24:29.6
is not to convince the majority of senators, because so many of the senators,
24:32.8
including the Republican Party, were elected and came under the neo-Reaganite sort of dispensation.
24:38.1
And the reality is that the only person in the American system
24:41.4
who has ultimate responsibility for foreign policy is the president.
24:44.0
As Harry Truman said, the buck stops here.
24:46.4
So senators can go on television and comment.
24:48.6
They're, you know, they have some, obviously they have power in term,
24:52.6
but it's a kind of blocking power or an authorization power or appropriateness.
24:56.7
It's very indirect.
24:58.1
And I say that with respect, of course, but the president's the one ultimately responsible.
25:01.9
So I'm not saying that there's going to be some political movement that people are,
25:05.0
a million people on the street who say, oh, we want foreign policy,
25:07.8
privatization, that's not going to happen for obvious reasons.
25:10.3
But I think a self, a rational president who's thinking about what's best for the country
25:15.3
and best for his political legacy or her political legacy, et cetera,
25:18.7
is going to say, I can't run the neo-Reaganite playbook
25:22.0
because the American people don't want to cut Social Security and Medicare dramatically.
25:26.3
I can't borrow too much money because interest rates are too high.
25:29.5
I'd love to have a much bigger and better military, but readiness is in a terrible state
25:33.5
and the defense industrial base is in terrible shape and we're not fixing it with the Ukraine.
25:37.8
So that's the kind of stuff, if you're on the hill, you can say this kind of thing,
25:41.4
but if you're actually responsible for it at the National Security Council or the Defense Department
25:45.1
or the president himself, then you're going to say, okay, that's a nice talking point.
25:49.7
But anyway, back here at reality, I can't act like that.
25:52.8
And then of course the Chinese and the Russians are going to look at reality,
25:55.6
not propaganda at the end of the day.
25:57.9
So that's like, and then I think politically, what you could say is,
26:02.3
you could say to the neo-Reaganites, you could say, look, we can't do what you're saying
26:06.3
and the American people don't support it.
26:07.8
You know, just to give you, I think very illuminating,
26:11.5
an AP poll found the majority of Republican voters want a smaller U.S. role in the world.
26:16.1
Half of independents want the same.
26:18.6
A majority of Democrats want, according to that poll, want a larger American role in the world.
26:22.7
But here's the thing, very important for frontline U.S. allies,
26:26.0
a separate poll by Reuters found that a substantial majority of Democrats
26:30.7
oppose U.S. military, the use of the military force in any or almost any circumstances.
26:35.9
So what Democrats are thinking when they're asked,
26:37.6
that question is more development aid, more engagement with the U.N.,
26:40.9
more international institutions.
26:42.3
They're not thinking about going to war with China or Russia, right, mostly.
26:46.6
So that's the political reality.
26:47.9
So you say the neo-Reaganites, look, I can't do everything,
26:50.0
but, you know, we're going to have an international policy
26:53.0
that's going to be focused on Asia, that's going to stay in NATO in my view, but adapt it.
26:56.8
And then you say to the political base, the energy, is to say, look,
27:02.2
we're not going to get in any stupid wars anymore if we can possibly avoid it.
27:06.6
You know, and when I say I'm always, I always point out I was against the Iraq war,
27:09.7
I was against the nation building mission in Afghanistan,
27:12.6
I was against the intervention in Libya, et cetera, et cetera.
27:16.2
They've been, you know, very, you know, among other things.
27:19.5
So then you say, look, you can trust us with sharp objects,
27:24.5
but, you know, we also have to live in a world where there's, you know,
27:27.4
the Chinese are in a historic military buildup.
27:29.0
We can't ignore that.
27:29.9
And if you, by the way, if you want to re-industrialize America
27:32.9
and pursue industrial policy in America, you can't let China dominate Asia.
27:36.6
They're going to control the world's largest market area.
27:38.7
So I think that's how it, and then, and then you, you know,
27:41.4
political strategy and so forth, you could find in between that.
27:44.5
But I, the way the American system is set up, I think that, that, that strategy will work.
27:49.0
And, and honestly, I think it's going to be, we will inevitably follow it at some point.
27:53.7
The question is whether we do it with enough time to head off some of the bad outcomes.
27:57.7
And that's the acme of, of strategy.
28:00.0
Of course, we're not really doing that right now.
28:02.8
So what you're saying is there's, there's going to be proactive stewardship if a good,
28:06.6
good president comes in and there'll be sufficient deference perhaps by the rest
28:11.7
in terms of that stewardship and all, hopefully.
28:14.7
Well, it's kind of, it's the least bad equilibrium for them.
28:17.7
You know, I think, I don't know.
28:19.2
I mean, that's my optimism.
28:20.2
That's my political strategy aspiration, whether it ends up like that, I don't know, but.
28:24.8
No, I think in a very Socratic method, we laid out the big picture, the big ideas,
28:29.5
grand strategy, how we're going to approach this issue.
28:32.6
Now, what was your experience?
28:34.0
I mean, to the degree that you can see in public,
28:36.6
when you serve as a senior official during the Trump administration, because
28:40.0
during this time, dealing with allies like the Philippines was quite tricky, I would say.
28:44.1
You had someone like President Duterte was openly, well, he didn't cause Trump,
28:47.9
but it caused Obama questioning the alliance.
28:51.1
But it seems President Trump and President Duterte had fantastic rapport,
28:54.2
at least at the personal level.
28:55.4
But it was quite a challenging moment in the alliance between the two countries.
28:59.9
What was your understanding of that?
29:02.0
Do you think it was more like the chickens are coming home to roost?
29:05.1
That something was fundamental?
29:06.5
Lacking the alliance?
29:07.5
Or you're just dealing with some other crazy dictator?
29:11.9
I mean, honestly, what was your understanding?
29:14.7
Well, yeah, yeah, yeah, sure.
29:16.7
I mean, so so I didn't deal with the Philippines really at all.
29:20.6
When I was in the in the Trump administration, my job was primarily I did have engagements
29:24.9
with allies, but my job was primarily internally focused on the strategy.
29:29.9
So I don't speak about the management of the relationship, the very important relationship
29:36.5
With any kind of authority from that sort of perspective, people like Randy Shriver,
29:41.0
a good friend of mine who I admire greatly, he would have a much clearer sense of what
29:45.1
the that or another.
29:47.3
Eli Ratner, same very good friend, someone I admire a lot, too.
29:51.2
They would have a better.
29:52.2
What I will say is kind of looking at it from from, I guess, in the Pentagon, but also just
29:56.3
watching that relationship closely over the years.
29:59.4
You know, it's interesting, Richard, I would actually apply a similar.
30:03.4
Approach as I apply to our domestic policy, it's actually interesting.
30:06.3
This is relevant, for instance, in looking at how we're managing the relationship, say,
30:09.4
with South Korea right now, which is to say, obviously, I think what President Marcos is
30:14.9
doing is exceptional and deserves our support and applause and engagement, and we should
30:21.5
facilitate that in whatever way possible.
30:23.9
On the other hand, President Duterte presumably represents some significant, at least latent
30:29.1
element in Philippine society.
30:31.5
And, you know, there are reasons for them.
30:35.5
Probably better than others as as the war weariness in our country.
30:39.6
Some of the reasons are probably better than others.
30:41.5
But it is a political fact and it can be changed over time.
30:46.4
But I think the best way to change it is to engage with it and be sensitive to it.
30:51.9
And that's, I think, a really important part.
30:53.2
I mean, just to bring it back to America for once.
30:55.1
I think the political strategy of a lot of those neo Reaganites today who continue to
30:59.7
hold the levers of power is interesting.
31:01.9
Yesterday, in foreign policy, Jack Dutch is a good reporter.
31:05.2
You know, a lot of the committee chairs are still in that near Reaganite faction,
31:09.0
but they're they're retiring.
31:10.3
They're they're fading, right?
31:11.8
Their political strategy is mystifying to me because it involves excluding and talking
31:16.6
down to the skeptics about military rather than engaging with them.
31:20.4
And so I think that's actually just going to make their situation worse and it makes
31:23.5
it more likely that ultimately we pursue a much stronger and ill-advised version of restraints.
31:30.1
So if I'm taking the same logic and I hadn't kind of thought this connection, but to the
31:34.3
Philippines, I would say.
31:35.1
We need to support President Marcos, et cetera, but we need to understand that there is a
31:40.1
significant current in Philippine society and in Philippine thinking that for obvious
31:45.2
historic reasons and so forth is there's a degree of resentment about the United States.
31:49.2
So let's let's not pretend that that's gone, but let's work with it.
31:54.0
The analogy I use in South Korea is President Yun obviously has been very active in working
31:59.0
with the United States, and that's great.
32:02.8
I'm not sure that reflects an.
32:04.9
Enduring sort of majority or most powerful factor in South Korean society.
32:12.2
And the midterm elections, the parliamentary elections are indicative.
32:17.8
They did not go well for President Yun's party.
32:19.3
I mean, I don't want to comment about, but just looking at it from a strategic perspective,
32:23.7
I think we should assume that there is an enduring element on the Japan issue.
32:29.1
Obviously the kind of more left wing perspective towards North Korea that has not just disappeared.
32:33.5
So, so the way that I would think about again, bringing it back to the Philippines is
32:38.1
let's do as much as we can because we need to focus on the military situation,
32:42.2
the defense of Philippines and so forth.
32:44.4
But we also should be, you know, cognizant that this is, this is still very present
32:50.2
and needs to be respected, even if we don't agree with it and engaged with.
32:54.9
Yeah, that was a very good diplomatic answer.
32:57.8
No, but, but it was substantive.
32:60.0
Well, I mean, it actually, I'm not trying to.
33:01.7
It wasn't vacuous.
33:02.9
It was, but, but I mean, artfully put, I would put it that way.
33:07.5
I mean, you're absolutely right.
33:08.9
I mean, it is true that, you know, Duterte could be easily dismissed by some quarters.
33:14.1
Oh, he was just some crazy guy.
33:16.8
Don't worry about it.
33:17.6
But I think there is a significant minority at least and influential folks, you know,
33:23.5
including in my circles who believe that it's an important alliance.
33:27.8
China is a threat, but we were taken for granted for far, far too long.
33:32.9
I understand if the US has been hundreds of billions of dollars to some special allies
33:38.1
in some part of the world.
33:39.3
But when I see the Pakistan's and Jordan's of this world, you know,
33:44.0
enjoying more state of the art F-16 fighters, Egypt, well, I understand in 1979 context,
33:50.1
but you know, Abram, you wonder, you wonder if something's going wrong, gone wrong here.
33:55.9
I mean, obviously I can talk about deficits on the Philippines part,
33:59.5
but I think it would be unfair to just blame the Philippines
34:02.9
for any shortcomings and deficits in this alliance.
34:05.2
And, and to be honest, I think folks from both, both sides of the political spectrum would say that,
34:09.8
you know, you don't want also an alliance whereby one is just one side is a rentier,
34:14.5
Meaning it's just basing access and the other side is about weapons.
34:17.1
You know, you want to have a symmetrical, a symmetrical relationship.
34:20.6
Maybe it's, I mean, look, people make the same point about President Trump.
34:23.3
You know, the people in NATO who said, oh, phew, he's gone.
34:25.7
That was going to, and now it's like, you know, actually they got the attention that
34:28.5
President Trump actually, A, reflects very real sentiment.
34:32.9
And structural factors that are, that need to be addressed in the NATO alliance and actually
34:38.2
doing NATO a favor by forcing them to grapple with the issue before it becomes too late.
34:44.9
And so, you know, I'm not saying again, like I think President Marcos is pursuing absolutely
34:49.8
the right policy, but I think we did, we did get a wake up call in taking, and I mean,
34:54.5
we probably did, there probably was a degree in which the message Manila for granted.
34:58.0
So, okay, now we've been put on notice and let's take it seriously and let's take this
35:02.7
thing out of that critique by engaging, you know, sincerely.
35:07.1
And I mean, for my own small part, but just as an example, I mean, I spent, we talked about
35:11.1
when we met, I mean, I spent a week in Manila.
35:13.6
I had not been to the Philippines before, but I was like, this is a vital, I need to
35:17.3
spend some time here.
35:18.1
I need to talk to people.
35:19.6
And that's, I think that's the kind of, you know, just in a microcosm, but that's the
35:22.8
kind of approach Americans, instead of going to Germany for the 5,000th time, you know,
35:28.3
yes, it takes a little bit longer to get out to Southeast Asia, but Asia is more important
35:32.7
So we should act accordingly.
35:35.6
Sorry to our friends, but yeah, I mean, that's the thing.
35:39.3
You don't have to apologize.
35:40.2
I've met many Americans who say they have never been into the Philippines or they have
35:43.7
just been to the Philippines once or twice.
35:45.3
I mean, these are ex-military people.
35:47.0
These are people who serve in top positions.
35:49.7
But as I said, I think this conversation is taking place in a good moment, a moment whereby
35:54.9
there's, I think, awakening on all fronts.
35:57.1
I mean, since November, everyone's talking about a Trump 2.0 administration and how should
36:03.0
And you can expect in Europe what would be the rhetoric.
36:05.7
In Japan, you can see they're already moving.
36:07.8
I think former Prime Minister Asa just met former President Trump recently.
36:13.3
In the Philippines, I'll be honest, I think people are confident that Marcos and Trump
36:17.7
would hit it off well because of-
36:20.3
This is an old relationship.
36:23.7
I mean, Imelda Marcos, the mom who's still around, had fantastic relationship.
36:27.4
Oh, is that true?
36:28.6
I didn't actually know that.
36:29.6
I mean, you can check, you can Google it.
36:31.3
Like Imelda Marcos, the mom who's still around, had fantastic relationship. So I think-
36:31.9
Oh, is that true? I didn't actually know that.
36:32.2
I mean, Imelda Marcos, the mom who's still around, had fantastic relationship.
36:32.9
I mean, Imelda Marcos, the mom who's still around, had fantastic relationship.
36:33.2
You know, the Marcos spent a lot of time in Manhattan.
36:36.9
There's the New York connection and all of that.
36:38.9
Well, and they were close with Reagan and I think-
36:41.0
Exactly, exactly.
36:42.3
So there's a lot of intersectional-
36:46.1
Well, and of course, Filipinos have a special, given our history, we have a special connection
36:53.2
I think the Philippine relationship should be safe.
36:55.5
I think the Republicans and President Trump getting elected would be better.
36:58.6
But I think under any-
36:59.9
It's more, you know, it's interesting.
37:02.2
It was that New York Times article I mentioned.
37:04.1
I mean, I give a lot of credit to what people like Eli Ratner are doing and Sam Paparo and
37:09.2
Charlie Flynn and so forth are really deserve tremendous credit.
37:12.1
It's more like, as the old Saturday Night Live, more cowbell.
37:14.8
That's the issue.
37:15.4
It's like, it's more a race.
37:16.8
We're trying to have a race at the top in terms of who would do better and who would
37:20.6
have more focus and resources.
37:22.1
To me, that's where the dynamic will be on the first island chain.
37:27.3
And I think this is where we're going to transition to perhaps the penultimate part of our discussion
37:32.1
And I hope we'll have more and more discussion throughout the coming months.
37:35.6
Now, I mean, I just want to also add, I think one of the things some of us Filipinos, I mean,
37:40.9
not all, but again, this is probably minorities.
37:43.3
And I think many Americans forget Philippines was a colony of the United States.
37:47.4
I think sometimes the conversation-
37:48.6
Not our proudest at the moment.
37:50.3
No, we were colonized.
37:52.7
Although it had a special status.
37:56.1
I mean, of course, the more-
37:57.3
From the American point of view.
37:59.1
I mean, I wish the more Hispanic part in us is-
38:01.5
I'm angry at you, gringos, for taking away from the revolution, right?
38:06.6
That's the part of us.
38:08.2
We beat the Espanoles and then you guys came in and gringos took over.
38:12.7
Let's talk about 21st century and let's talk about what's happening right now.
38:16.5
So fundamentally, I think the argument here, and you could see both of us have been making
38:22.5
I just don't see how American can fight two major wars in any major theater.
38:28.8
I think the consensus is like 1.5.
38:31.5
Five wars is the best that America has.
38:33.2
Like that, I mean-
38:33.9
You already have Russia.
38:35.3
You have Russia already in Ukraine, still there, $60 billion going to Ukraine most recently.
38:41.3
Of course, we know the development is also in the Middle East, a tricky situation.
38:44.5
But things are moving also in Asia as we speak.
38:46.8
So can you tell me, first of all, what is your reading of this new emergency fund passed
38:51.7
by the Senate and approved by President Biden?
38:55.1
$94 billion, if I'm not mistaken.
38:56.6
So it's a huge amount of money we're talking about.
38:59.7
Huge amount of money.
38:59.9
One of the leading members of the Senate.
39:01.4
I was saying it's not a lot of money, which is, I mean, it's surreal.
39:05.1
It's 64 billion for Ukraine, yeah, and 26 for Israel, 9 billion for humanitarian needs,
39:11.6
and then $8 billion for the Indo-Pacific.
39:13.7
I just want to be clear.
39:14.3
The entire Indo-Pacific, yeah.
39:15.8
Entire Indo-Pacific, not the Philippines alone.
39:19.4
I think Taiwan is like $2 billion or less.
39:21.7
And as Mike Gallagher said in one of his more lucid commentary on this, it's a joke.
39:28.5
So, you know, I mean, look.
39:31.4
This debate is, it's kind of puerile, actually, I would say, and I say that advisedly,
39:39.7
because we are making choices.
39:42.7
And what's very frustrating is that we are not facing those choices.
39:48.2
I would actually prefer it if people would say, we're choosing Europe, and here's why.
39:55.5
Because almost $94 billion or $5 billion is a lot of money.
40:00.7
And the country, especially Republicans, but the country as a whole, is very concerned
40:08.0
And people are war-weary.
40:09.7
So when we spend that amount of money, that money is zero-sum.
40:14.7
Like deficits, sorry Dick Cheney, deficits do matter.
40:17.8
And Jay Powell has said that interest rates are becoming huge.
40:21.3
So like a president who came in, okay, trying to be as efficient about this as possible.
40:29.1
I think the Chinese have plenty of reasons.
40:31.3
Why they would use military force against the United States.
40:33.7
As Eli Ratner has said, not just to solve the Taiwan issue, but to drive the Americans
40:37.3
out of the Western Pacific.
40:38.5
You mentioned the example of the Philippines.
40:40.3
It's worth pointing out the United States, at least as I understand it, our initial war
40:44.5
goals in 1898 were not the acquisition of the Philippines, but because of the dynamic
40:49.1
created by the defeat of the Spanish and the pressure about potential German intervention,
40:53.8
we ended up going into the Philippines.
40:55.0
Stumbled into empire.
40:56.2
I think that's the truth.
40:57.3
Which is unfortunate.
40:58.1
But if you're China and you defeat the Americans,
41:00.7
in a war over the Western Pacific, why don't you solve the Philippines question while you
41:04.8
can from a position of advantage?
41:06.5
And they are building a military to do that.
41:08.2
So that's the way to deter the Chinese.
41:11.2
And God forbid if a war happens to defeat them is with military forces.
41:15.3
I mean, economic sanctions are frankly a joke.
41:18.8
I mean, look at the Russians obviously are not being influenced in any material way.
41:23.3
The Chinese are not really, the Chinese are doing, are basically propping up the Russian
41:27.3
war effort and economy just without violating the Chinese.
41:30.5
The European sanctions, even as they prepare to be sanctioned, which is telling.
41:35.2
And then even worse, I mean, this is really pathetic that this has happened,
41:40.1
but so telling about the inutility of economic sanctions.
41:44.5
Kirk Campbell, but then Cavoli, the US commander of US forces in Europe, the
41:50.1
Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, the Russian military has reconstituted already.
41:55.2
Already, according, don't take it from me, already.
41:57.0
I thought it would take a few more years, but it's already reconstituted.
41:60.0
They're defensive.
42:00.4
The defense industry is humming and the North Koreans and the Iranians who were kind of
42:04.3
probably kind of cut out somewhat for the Chinese are basically helping them out, plugging
42:08.4
gaps as they go along.
42:10.1
So it's like, okay, the war in Ukraine is not going well.
42:14.5
I sympathize with the Ukrainian cause, but I think we've talked about the need for strategic
42:18.4
prioritization, right?
42:20.1
And so in this context where, don't take it from me, look what Sam Paparo just said, where
42:26.6
we are not, we're doing better, but we are not doing it as well as the.
42:31.2
And as Top Gun says, there are no points for second place.
42:34.1
If you're a runner and you've got fat over the off season and you lost weight, that's
42:38.5
not enough to guarantee you defeat your opponent.
42:42.0
Duh, it's common sense.
42:44.0
We're shipping $61 billion.
42:46.1
And the fact that Republicans in the House did not use the opportunity to try to drive
42:50.9
more resources towards the Pacific, towards a clearer strategy for Ukraine, and not to
42:59.6
mention the border.
43:00.2
It's tragic because I think we will not have such opportunities in the future.
43:06.0
And these triple bank shot logic arguments that things are going to improve.
43:10.5
I mean, just today I was tweeting, there's, again, another propaganda talking point.
43:15.4
Oh, we're fixing the defense industrial base by funding Ukraine.
43:18.7
It's like, no, because the money that's going in the defense industrial base is going to
43:21.6
be used to buy weapons for Ukraine, which means they won't.
43:24.9
And the defense industrial base is in scarcity, not just because of money, but because of
43:30.2
Because of the scarcity of components, et cetera.
43:32.5
So we're choosing Ukraine.
43:34.9
And where I don't think we're going to, I don't see a path for the Ukrainians to quote
43:40.5
I think they could have a viable defensive strategy that could lead to something like
43:45.4
That's a rational goal.
43:47.7
But almost immediately after the supplemental pass, we're now seeing, if you look at my
43:52.5
Twitter, I've highlighted a bunch of these, where they're already forecasting the need
43:55.8
for another supplemental.
43:58.5
And so this is...
44:01.2
Such a triumph for China because they've...
44:04.1
And now I'm not even mentioning the Middle East where we're blowing through critical
44:07.1
munitions, tons of money, $1.5 billion for the interception of the Iranian missiles,
44:15.2
et cetera, the Houthis.
44:17.6
So without acknowledging the trade-off, we are making decisions that obviously...
44:23.6
And your point on Twitter is, it's really an indictment of our strategic and political
44:30.1
class that we are not doing this with forethought.
44:33.0
I think any business that was run like this, they would fire the leadership because they're
44:38.1
not openly going through...
44:40.9
I would object on principle, but it wouldn't be such a profound failure.
44:49.1
Well, it would be, but if it were at least done consciously, then at least we could try
44:54.3
to mitigate and have a rational conversation.
44:56.4
But right now, we're dealing in fairytale land.
45:02.2
Realistically, the people who are going to pay are frontline allies.
45:05.0
I mean, another example is like, you got Kirk Campbell out there talking about how our extended
45:09.6
nuclear deterrent is so strong.
45:12.1
And it's like the North Koreans have dozens of nuclear weapons.
45:14.7
Our missile defenses are not perfect.
45:21.3
I think fewer than 1% of Americans probably know that we have an extended nuclear deterrent
45:25.0
commitment to South Korea.
45:27.7
So if the North Koreans call our bluff, particularly in the country, they're going to call us a
45:30.5
And if they call us a threat in the context of a war with China, and our cities in the
45:34.9
Pacific Northwest and so forth are vulnerable, is that a realistic, is that a credible strategy?
45:40.1
Like, we need to get much more real than we are.
45:44.2
Let's talk about that.
45:45.3
I mean, I really appreciate this intervention.
45:47.4
I mean, just to be clear, I think both of us, our hearts go to people of Ukraine.
45:51.6
I mean, we definitely...
45:53.3
This is where you and I will definitely disagree with John Mearsheimer.
45:56.5
I'm not going to go...
45:58.9
He got it like 100% wrong.
46:01.3
Russia has some agency in this.
46:03.7
I mean, hello, as if, you know, I'm sure if someone less Putin was there, it probably
46:08.0
would be a different word.
46:11.0
So we're talking about 90 billion.
46:12.5
I mean, in a reasonable world, are you looking at what kind of split?
46:16.1
Like 50 billion to in the Pacific?
46:19.7
I mean, just an idea, right?
46:21.7
Order of magnitude.
46:23.2
Order of magnitude.
46:25.3
60 billion to the Pacific.
46:27.9
20 billion to the UK.
46:28.9
20 billion to Ukraine and 20 billion to Israel or something.
46:30.9
Something like that.
46:31.5
And then something for the border and changes in policy in the border.
46:35.0
That's a separate, you know...
46:36.1
Speaking of this, Elvis, again, so that we don't run the risk of, you know, we're calling
46:40.5
for abandonment of Ukraine.
46:42.0
I mean, just the first level, what do you think is the reasonable strategy here?
46:46.3
Because I think any reasonable strategy would say you should put Ukraine in a position
46:49.7
to negotiate peace.
46:52.9
So I think the right...
46:54.6
So actually, what General Zelushny said in CNN a few months ago made a lot of sense.
46:58.9
To me, he's like, the Russians have what Mearsheimer says that's correct, that they
47:02.8
have more money and people and weapons and they're highly resolute on the issue.
47:06.9
And there's, you know, the Ukrainian population is shrunk, et cetera.
47:09.6
So a defensive strategy, taking advantage of technology.
47:13.3
There was just something about how the Ukrainians are pulling Abrams tanks out of the front
47:16.8
line because tanks are so vulnerable to drones and electronic warfare has become more competitive.
47:22.7
But, you know, the Ukrainians can be building defensive fortifications along the lines of
47:27.6
what the Russians did.
47:28.7
In 2023, all these sort of things.
47:31.8
And then a lot of what I'm doing is sending, trying to send a credible signal along the
47:35.7
lines of what I think President Trump is trying to do, send a credible signal to the Europeans
47:39.8
that they really do need to do this, right?
47:41.3
The problem with what President Biden has done is by, you know, having all these nice
47:45.5
photo ops and being nice to the Europeans, he's undercut the urgency of the burden shifting,
47:49.9
which is inevitable because it reflects structural factors.
47:52.2
So he's actually hurting the Transatlantic Alliance rather than helping.
47:55.1
So actually, President Trump and the fact that there could be Trump 2.0, I hope there is,
47:58.7
is actually helping the Europeans by injecting the necessary sense of urgency and realism.
48:03.5
And in fact, you do see that actually President Macron gave a speech.
48:05.8
I mean, Macron says a lot of things.
48:07.3
The follow through is not so great.
48:08.9
But European Minister of Defense Pistorius in Germany is saying that the Germans may
48:14.5
need to go 3.5 percent.
48:15.8
The polls are doing even across a very bitter political divide.
48:19.2
So we need to encourage that exactly to give them a position of strength to make the best
48:23.9
negotiated settlement, even if it's temporary.
48:26.0
And yes, the Russians are going to be a threat.
48:27.7
So we need to be realistic.
48:29.4
But the point is, the Americans can't be the ones overwhelmingly shouldering the load.
48:37.4
I'll tell you what.
48:38.1
I mean, I was in Berlin not long ago.
48:40.8
And behind the scenes, actually just here also, we're with a lot of European friends.
48:44.9
I think behind the scenes, there is a recognition that Europe has to step up the game.
48:49.9
I mean, I'm sure if Trump wins again, comes back, there is going to be the usual diplomatic
48:55.4
kind of, I don't know, kabuki show, if I can put it that way.
48:58.5
But behind the scenes, I'm sure there's this idea of, hey, Europe has to be jolted out.
49:04.2
And clearly, Germany and to a lesser degree, France would have to really step up their
49:09.6
I mean, Germany is by far the biggest economy.
49:11.7
It's the center of the European economy.
49:13.0
So it's mostly about Germany.
49:14.1
I mean, the Poles are doing their part.
49:15.7
The Brits talk a bigger game than they follow through on.
49:18.3
But other countries will plug in if the Germans do their part.
49:21.0
So that's why I spend a lot of time on the Germans.
49:24.4
But I think it's for their own benefit and certainly for the benefit of the
49:28.5
countries that are most vulnerable to Russian aggression, which, by the way,
49:31.0
were the countries that the Germans occupied in World War Two.
49:33.2
So they have a special obligation to help them.
49:36.4
And but I suppose you're a little bit more optimistic with the Polans of this world.
49:41.5
I think Poland has stepped up to the game.
49:43.4
Poland's been great.
49:44.9
They have been doing their job.
49:45.9
And so I really elevate them whenever I get a chance.
49:47.8
I talk to the Poles all the time.
49:49.5
They don't like my prioritization for reasons that if I were Polish, I would be arguing against
49:53.5
the two, but they understand where I'm coming from.
49:55.9
And I think there's an alignment of perspective.
49:58.4
Where the Poles are doing, the Poles trust the Americans, but they want to make sure
50:02.5
that they don't overweight on the American commitment by building up their own very significant
50:07.2
defense capability, which makes it easier for the American people to substantiate that
50:11.2
commitment since the commitment.
50:12.3
And this is the thing, you know, I get like this guy in the FT went after me for saying
50:15.7
that we would withhold forces in the event.
50:17.6
To your point about one or 1.5 wars, it's like, well, it's only rational for an American
50:23.4
president, whether it's President Biden or President Trump, to withhold forces in the
50:27.4
event of a conflict.
50:28.2
In Europe, because the Asia is more important.
50:30.1
That's like our that's actually our stated strategy.
50:32.5
So I'm just following the logic of we don't have enough.
50:35.3
If we if we put all of the key forces into a war in Europe and they're tied down or destroyed,
50:40.5
the Chinese would be crazy not to move.
50:42.6
Then we get a worse situation.
50:44.1
Europe is worse off because we have to we have to, you know, pull vacuum our forces
50:49.0
out of the rest of the world.
50:50.3
So like who's doing anybody a favor by hiding that fact?
50:54.1
That's not helping the Europeans.
50:55.3
They should understand that.
50:56.5
That doesn't mean leaving NATO.
50:58.8
That means like, here's what we can do.
51:00.2
Here's you know, I've made I made too many loans.
51:02.9
Here's what I can pay back.
51:05.3
You know, I mean, I wish you I mean, obviously, I know your answer, but I think this has to
51:11.4
Do you think the Chinese now are deliberately supporting at least two or three?
51:15.3
Yeah, absolutely.
51:16.4
I think that's down in other regions because this is too good.
51:20.6
I mean, this is like, oh, the Chinese know what they're doing.
51:24.4
You know, Blinken's over there.
51:25.3
Oh, we're going to sanction.
51:26.5
You know, all these Julie Smith, the NATO ambassadors trying to put pressure on them
51:31.4
Greenfield, the ambassador was like, oh, I can't believe it.
51:35.3
These people are not stupid.
51:37.2
In fact, they're probably smarter than we are.
51:39.0
So like they you know, and and my point is, I'm not saying they're actively, you know,
51:44.3
Professor Moriarty, like, you know, from the Sherlock Holmes story behind every single
51:48.1
job until now, it's more like the other uses who will rid me of this meddlesome priest.
51:52.6
You know, the story of Henry the second, you know.
51:56.1
if you decide to do something in the Middle East.
51:58.9
Yeah, I'll be you know, don't worry, I'll be behind you.
52:01.5
I don't actually need to know, you know, did Putin tell she exactly what's going to happen?
52:08.2
That's not even necessary, though, for my argument.
52:10.8
China is is in great shape now.
52:13.0
They're having economic problems.
52:14.5
That's a different story.
52:16.1
But from a strategic point of view, they are doing very well in the last few years.
52:21.3
I mean, we we shot a whole almost a whole year's worth of SM six missiles,
52:25.3
which are very expensive and can be used for air defense and land attack.
52:28.9
Those are critical for the Pacific.
52:30.6
We shot a whole year's worth almost against the Houthis with no discernible result by
52:36.7
the president's own mission.
52:37.7
And now his special envoy is saying it only has a diplomatic solution.
52:42.0
I mean, can you we just blew what it's like?
52:44.7
Hey, here's some money.
52:45.7
We're going to light it on fire for no no particular purpose.
52:48.4
I mean, that's how bad the situation is.
52:51.0
Yeah, just stick the box.
52:52.1
You know, like, oh, we did something about, you know what they were doing in the room.
52:55.2
The Red Sea or something like that.
52:56.6
Now, what is the ideal situation here in Asia?
53:00.6
I mean, to be fair to the Biden administration.
53:03.6
I mean, and then you and I, we know about L.A.
53:06.5
There are a lot of smart people inside.
53:08.3
We know they're fantastic people in terms of the China challenge.
53:15.7
We're still in the diplomatic nice mode.
53:18.9
That's as nice as I'll go.
53:20.0
Let's give it up.
53:22.5
I mean, there are certain things that are moving.
53:25.3
There's the there's the trilaterals, Korea, Japan, U.S.
53:30.3
There's the AUKUS.
53:31.7
Now there's what I call Jaffas.
53:33.7
Japan, Philippine, U.S.
53:36.6
This seems what the interesting, I don't know, building blocks of a potential.
53:41.2
Let's call it the Great Wall of Democracy.
53:44.1
Or what you call the counter hegemonic kind of coalition.
53:48.6
So the ideal situation for you is whoever becomes the next president next year is that
53:55.0
you know, you draw down in other parts of the world, help your allies to be strong.
53:59.1
I mean, you have very powerful allies in NATO and also powerful allies in the Middle East,
54:02.7
as we can see in the recent rounds of the developments.
54:06.3
So it's really about helping the Koreas and Japan, Philippine, Australia.
54:12.0
Can you tell me about your understanding of how should the America approach this next year?
54:17.6
Yeah, let me let me let me let me put it really pointedly.
54:21.6
I think the Biden administration.
54:22.8
So what Eli and what the military.
54:25.0
Is going on, the military side is very encouraging, but it's inadequate.
54:28.3
And that's not because of the lack of any comment on him.
54:30.9
That's that has to do with macro factors in terms of overall orientation of the administration
54:35.3
and then structural factors that go back along a long time.
54:38.9
But it's inadequate.
54:40.6
And so my basic view is the Biden administration's Asia policy will look great if there's no
54:44.5
war or Berlin or Cuba style crisis with China.
54:47.3
But I think there's a very real chance of a war, especially if we continue to underestimate
54:52.1
the military capacity, because these.
54:54.5
Multi these mini lateral lattice stuff is fine.
54:59.4
They're good in some obviously in ways, especially if they lead to improvements in the military
55:04.5
situation, which they are in places like Japan and in the Philippines, albeit inadequately.
55:09.4
And that's the key point.
55:10.7
What worries me is two things.
55:12.4
One, they give a false sense of confidence that things are moving, which like they're
55:17.3
not moving fast enough.
55:19.3
So like if we have a bunch of photo ops at Camp David and the Japanese and the Koreans
55:24.8
What's going on at the level of the military balance that's changed adequate to the threat.
55:30.5
That's the point.
55:30.9
There's no points for second place.
55:32.9
Secondly, I think there is a risk.
55:34.9
It contributes to a Chinese perception of being encircled and contained and even strangled,
55:39.6
which is the term that Xi Jinping apparently uses.
55:41.3
So it accelerates their aggressive potential.
55:44.6
So from a position of weakness and coupled with the economic measures.
55:48.2
So, you know, banning TikTok ain't going to do anything about defeating a Chinese invasion
55:52.4
They're not going to invade.
55:53.7
You're not going to.
55:54.1
Defeat the PLA with hashtags.
55:56.6
It's about cold, hard steel.
55:58.3
And I don't want to.
55:58.9
And so to me, we should speak softly and carry a big stick.
56:01.7
I think there's been a lot of big flashy stuff.
56:05.2
Which is not bad and can be good.
56:08.1
But we need to see what the results are relative.
56:10.6
Again, what Paparo said to what the Chinese are doing and the North Koreans are doing,
56:15.6
And that's the big problem.
56:17.1
So to me, I would actually kind of tone down some of the stuff potentially not not against
56:23.5
But like really focus on the concrete stuff and making sure the military balance is adequate,
56:29.0
which is that's that's not a matter of having a meeting at Camp David.
56:32.9
It may be if if you need to have the meeting at Camp David, maybe do it.
56:35.7
But maybe you don't make such a big deal out of it in terms of the photo ops and, you know,
56:39.5
all that sort of thing.
56:41.6
Because you can end up with the worst of both worlds.
56:43.9
Antagonism necessarily.
56:45.8
But at the same time, not be prepared.
56:47.5
That's what I feel like we're doing a little bit.
56:49.9
I could guess that last year on the.
56:53.7
South China Sea issue.
56:56.1
What is your read of what's happening right now?
56:58.0
Because, you know, for a long time, we talk about gray zone strategy by China, anything
57:01.6
short of, you know, armed clashes, et cetera.
57:04.3
But, you know, they're using water cannons that are ten times the power of Mike Tyson.
57:08.3
I mean, you can put it in aggressive punch power and we have Philippine naval officers.
57:13.6
So I think the sense in the Philippines is we're doing our part, perhaps even more than
57:18.2
anyone expected, given our capabilities and all.
57:22.1
What do you think should be?
57:23.0
What should be America's response here without being patronizing?
57:27.3
Because I think the Philippines can still do the resupply on the oil.
57:29.5
But what is the optimum American response to an ally which US will be dragged into a war
57:35.6
if something goes crazy there?
57:37.2
What should be it?
57:37.8
Well, I think we need to stand with the Philippines on that point.
57:40.3
I mean, obviously, we need to be prudent together and we should plan together.
57:42.9
But I think it is correct because, you know, we this Philippines has put its neck out a
57:47.7
lot on on a lot also on basing and access and so forth.
57:50.8
So I actually don't know what the China.
57:52.9
Chinese are thinking.
57:53.7
It's a bit mystifying to me because it seems to be infuriating to the Philippines without
57:57.5
being truly intimidating.
57:59.3
And Beijing had managed to alienate President Marcos and I think the Philippine population.
58:04.8
So they're not they're not obviously not dumb.
58:08.5
So I don't know what they're doing.
58:10.0
I don't know what exactly.
58:11.1
I mean, I think what we're doing now, I mean, seems within the realm of, you know, the right
58:16.5
Unfortunately, it's not trying to see.
58:17.6
I think a lot of it's hard to deal with because the Chinese are not seizing, you know, they're
58:22.6
not seizing occupied areas.
58:24.1
They're creating new land in places where they just have the capacity advantage.
58:27.5
So, you know, I think it's a very difficult issue, but and certainly very concerning.
58:34.5
And lastly, on Taiwan, what is your understanding of the Taiwan situation?
58:39.5
Are you of the belief that.
58:42.1
China's planning will depend on how prepared we are or is that China's plan or this is
58:46.6
all just blah, blah, blah by China?
58:48.2
No, no, I think I think well, look, I think there's no peaceful unification scenario.
58:52.6
In the near term, medium term.
58:54.1
And if Xi Jinping believes that Taiwan is necessary for the great rejuvenation of Chinese
58:58.5
nation or the Taiwan might continue moving away from them.
59:01.4
And also there's the strangulation issues at the macroeconomic level.
59:04.5
I think then war becomes a very rational option if they can succeed.
59:09.2
And that's where military denial becomes so vital, both by and my main concern there is
59:14.6
our inadequate detention attention given the scale of the threat and Taiwan's manifest
59:19.4
lack of urgency relative to the scale of the threat.
59:21.7
I think they're moving in.
59:22.3
The right direction on asymmetric defense and so forth.
59:24.6
But it's ridiculous that that country spends like two point five percent of GDP on defense.
59:28.5
I mean, they should be spending ten percent if it were up to me.
59:30.5
I don't know if I were them, but like, I don't know, five percent.
59:33.6
And they should be making the case for prioritizing Taiwan.
59:35.9
It's absolutely absurd to have people like Bikim Shao and Joseph Wu be calling for Ukraine.
59:40.9
I mean, they just they could have gotten 40 billion dollars out of that.
59:44.5
But, you know, the number one argument I get against probably the most effective argument
59:49.7
against against my position to try to help Taiwan.
59:52.2
Defend itself is, well, the Taiwanese don't seem to think which when if and when the Chinese
59:58.5
move and attack, people will remember that they didn't think it was urgent enough for
60:04.5
So it makes my arguments a lot harder.
60:07.7
And I've said this to them directly.
60:09.7
But you're concerned of potential also technological complacency considering the you know, I mean,
60:16.1
Russia didn't do very well during its invasion and we saw the superiority of NATO weapon
60:21.3
I mean, this is the.
60:22.2
Of course, from our analysis of where the war is going.
60:24.0
But I think there is also a risk to saying, oh, these are just a bunch of paper tiger
60:28.0
authoritarian powers, right?
60:29.3
We can take care of them.
60:30.1
Well, that's obviously not the Ukrainians don't think that anymore.
60:32.6
If you don't press the electronic electronic warfare drones, the Russians have adapted
60:37.4
And yes, we've learned from the conflict in Ukraine, but presumably so of the Chinese.
60:41.4
So we should definitely not take.
60:43.2
And I mean, who are we to be so arrogant?
60:47.5
We were very successful against Iraq.
60:49.7
We were successful against the Taliban in the initial phases.
60:54.1
Not ultimately, we did not succeed in Vietnam and we were fought to a draw and the Chinese
60:59.7
pushed us halfway down the peninsula in Korea when they were very weak, you know, in certain
61:05.5
technologically and economically.
61:06.9
So I think we we should go back to that post Vietnam idea of respecting our adversaries.
61:13.8
And that's not where we are right now on that note.
61:17.7
Thank you, Richard.
61:18.6
I know I have to go.
61:19.6
I know I could see that.
61:21.0
Thank you so much.
61:23.1
Like, OK, let's continue this conversation.
61:26.4
And thank you so much for joining us.
61:28.8
And please, how can people follow you and where can they find your works and books and
61:34.0
how can they follow you?
61:36.7
I'm at Elbridge Colby on X or Twitter, our website, the Marathon Initiative.
61:41.4
You can check out online for longer articles and so forth.
61:44.2
I have a lot of interviews up there.
61:45.7
And my book, The Strategy of Denial, is available from Yale University Press.
61:49.6
And in English, it should be available in Asia.
61:51.7
But also it's been translated into Japanese, Korean and Chinese on Taiwan.
61:56.9
Congratulations on that.
61:58.3
Thank you so much and have a lovely day.
62:00.1
Thank you, Richard.
